While they have been hammering away at it for some time now, the US has announced that they have finally reached an agreement with the leadership of the Taliban to conclude a peace deal. Let’s be clear; this isn’t a peace deal, it’s an exit strategy. We’re almost 20 years into this quagmire and the line was always going to be drawn at some point. When the Special Forces’ Task Forces routed the Taliban from Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, their post-operational recommendation was very clear; flooding the country with occupying troops would be a rallying call to reinvigorate the Taliban and their jihadist allies. In the UK, however, I believe our collective military and political classes saw an opportunity to redress the historical stigma of our previous defeats in Afghanistan and couldn’t pass up on the chance to achieve this.
I spent over 3 years in Afghanistan with both UK and US military initiatives and observed first-hand the muddled objectives of our militaries deployments. The mission-creep encompassing a frankly embarrassing anti-narcotics focus, and all the way to our endgame status of handover of responsibility to the Afghan security forces for the protection of their own people and nation.
We extended our commitment to the deployment by conjuring up mission statements based upon our western templates of democracy and human rights. Education, Gender Equality, Healthcare to mitigate infant mortality, Anti-corruption, mentoring of Law Enforcement agencies to international compliance levels. And the list goes on.
Afghanistan remains a country where tribal and familial bonds far outweigh the tiny geographical influence that Kabul actually wields. Warlords continue to dominate and forge alliances based solely on personal gain and profit. Our well-intentioned first-world initiatives are not welcome or indeed remotely achievable, outside the ring of protective security around Kabul. Beyond this, and particularly in the remoter regions, life and law have changed very little over the centuries. So when our media reports success stories and heart-warming human interest pieces from the graveyard of empires, they do not reflect circumstances in the greater part of the country. Our twenty years of western intervention barely noticed in many regions.
So, this is an exit strategy that draws a line under the thousands of deaths and trillions of dollars that the 2 decades of this conflict has cost. And the future? Congratulatory soundbites from our Generals and political leaders lauding our achievements and how better off the country is after our ‘assistance’. The reality, of course, will be far more grim. Gloating Taliban will again dominate and control much of the country, initially portraying themselves as the saviours of the people. Then Taliban in-fighting as their collective breaks down and alliances are forged and formed, splinter groups and fragments turning on one another. At the same time, we will witness the collapse of the Afghan Security Forces, their effectiveness and capability nullified by the absent air superiority, intelligence provision and hand-holding that the coalition has been providing. Eventually, a return to full-scale conflict as warlords and jihadists vie for control of the country and the spoils of the capital and provincial cities.
This is not a pessimistic viewpoint by any means. A little-known fact, for me at least, is that when the Russians exited Afghanistan, it wasn’t the scurrying retreat that I had imagined. They actually conducted a comprehensive and documented handover of military bases, equipment and infrastructure as well as training in the maintenance and care required for upkeep. The Russians also sent some of their advisors back to Afghanistan periodically to monitor the condition of the military and the assets that they had retained. The advisers found abandoned bases stripped of every element that could be sold for profit; cables and wiring, generators and heaters, air-conditioners and refrigeration, bedding and furniture, transport and machinery. They reported finding deserted FOBs where the troops had taken flight, choosing to run rather than defend their positions. Senior officers rich in wealth and status having profited from the sale of the equipment and now set up as minor warlords in their own right. The Russians documented all of this, disappointed but unsurprised.
And in my opinion, this is the likely scenario that will repeat itself. First, the more remote FOBs and outposts will be looted and abandoned then occupied by the very forces they had been built to defend against. Without the support and mentoring of the larger western nations, the Afghan forces will have little confidence or motivation to continue putting their lives on the line and will simply down tools and return home. It’s worth remembering that one of the biggest hurdles the coalition faced was ensuring that the rank and file of the security forces actually received their salaries from the respective ministries. It was commonplace for senior officers to keep the entire wages of their police or soldiers for themselves. So, returning to that scenario, it isn’t exactly hard to imagine droves of these service personnel deserting their posts. Or worse, pledging their allegiance to the opposing forces out of self-preservation. And base by base, town by town and province by province, this domino effect will play out.
It is sad to think that the terrible loss of lives throughout this conflict have been sacrificed only to reach an exit strategy and not, as we’d hoped, a better country for the Afghan people to live in. Painful to imagine gloating Taliban governing the bazaars of Sangin and Nad e Ali, the legacy of the dead service men and women all but forgotten as the country rewinds back to where it was pre-9/11. A bitter pill to swallow for anyone who has had any engagement with our involvement in Afghanistan. In the UK, we are still coming to terms with the legacy of our government’s settlement with the republican movement in Northern Ireland. This was another exit strategy that was painted as a peace agreement, handing terrorists and criminals freedom from prosecution deals to expedite an end to violence. But then harassing and pursuing the service men and women who were carrying out government policy in an attempt to portray them as the criminals in the rewriting of the republican narrative. So, the familiar echoes of a ‘peace agreement’ with foes from a long-standing conflict are very fresh in our minds.
Have the Taliban won? I remember back in the early days when I was briefing a Cabinet Minister on one of our operations in a rural area and he asked me whether, in my opinion, I thought we were ‘winning’. I replied that it was an impossible question to answer as there was nothing to win. The enemy wasn’t a structured national army who we could beat into submission and formal surrender. The nation wasn’t responsible for the attacks on US soil and as such couldn’t be held to account and punished for them. And it wasn’t the bad old days of colonialism where we would occupy and govern the country to advance our economic and political goals. So you can’t really win when there is nothing to win in the first place.
And I believe it is the same for the Taliban. An important point to remember is that there is no single Taliban; they are a collective, loosely bound by tribal and familial loyalties that shift and break on a routine basis. Without the focus of a single cause with which to unite these bands of brigands, the collective will quickly unravel and the groups turn upon one another. So can they win? In the end, it comes down to definitions. If by winning, the Taliban determine that the withdrawal of the coalition from Afghanistan was their endgame then by that measure yes, they have won. But this victory is small and will ultimately be very short-lived as their ranks fracture and divide and their movement descends into violent chaos.
Have we won? No; because as I have already pointed out, as well-intentioned as our motives might have been, there was nothing we could actually win in the first place. And the fact that we have now entered into a formal agreement with the very terrorists who planted IEDs and tortured and killed thousands sticks hard in the back of the throat when we think about the sacrifices made over these last 2 decades. So that doesn’t feel particularly ‘winning’ either.
And what of the Afghan people? Have they won? I wouldn’t presume to speak for them but I would suggest that the thought of their country returning to the status of a failed state presided over by feuding warlords probably doesn’t make them feel like winners of very much.
So, no matter whether it’s labelled a peace deal or an exit strategy, after two decades of conflict, loss and sacrifice, there are no winners, only participants. The Taliban may think they’ve won but in truth all they have won is the extension of decades of fighting and the continued destruction of a country that, after 40-odd years of conflict, could do with a bit of a break.
