In an article I wrote almost 18 months ago, (https://www.jamesemack.com/have-the-taliban-won/) I covered what I thought a strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan would look like. Back then, the United States was talking about troop reductions in order to return control of the country back to the people of Afghanistan whose Security Forces were now deemed capable of this task. I wrote then that I considered this the beginning of an exit strategy and nothing else. Twenty years, trillions of dollars and thousands of deaths bringing the world’s superpowers to the line in the powder-fine, Afghan sand. I described how I thought the Afghan Security Forces would fail to hold ground, surrender and abandon their positions. How with no Air support, Intelligence provision and joint-mission hand-holding, there was no hope of the Afghans holding back the Taliban advance.
Sadly, all this has come to pass. Even as I write this piece, last week’s Pentagon assessment that the Taliban could take Kabul in a year has been hastily revised to the more realistic timeframe of 3 weeks. With most key provincial cities under or about to be under Taliban control, this is not just a pessimistic, worst-case scenario: It is a very real possibility. The city of Pol e Khomri, a mere 140 miles north of Kabul, was taken by the Taliban the evening before I began writing this. Afghan news footage of soldiers and police abandoning bases and stripping off uniforms in anticipation of Taliban victories showing the sad reality of life on the ground.
The Taliban have capitalised on our withdrawal from Afghanistan with a speed and ferocity that has surprised many. For me, I’m just surprised they’re surprised. Since the Taliban regrouped and re-entered the conflict in the early 2000s, they have consistently displayed tenacity for the long game and the capacity to launch fast, large-scale operations resulting in successes and gains beyond which they were deemed capable. The capture of the city of Kunduz in 2015 a good example of this. The largest city in the north-east of the country with a population of around 400,000. Despite being defended by Afghan and American Special Forces, the city fell quickly and had to be retaken with considerable effort and a major allocation US military assets.
There is also surprise stated at the poor performance of the Afghan Security Forces and their unwillingness or inability to fight the Taliban. There shouldn’t be. In the twenty or so years I have had involvement with the country, I’ve never seen a completely autonomous, Afghan security initiative of any significance make a considerable achievement. It had been tried, and probably many times, but, in my experience and observations at least, there was always a coalition command, control or support element involved. Where handovers of certain elements such as specialist training courses were conducted under capacity-building initiatives, these also failed quickly. We tried, as usual, to emboss our Western democratic template on a third-world fiefdom of warlord states and tribal domains. Took our military and law-enforcement models and applied them to a patriarchal society where for centuries nepotism and familial loyalty determined positions of command and influence.
We tried hard to cut the head off the snake of corruption but found that it was so endemic and accepted as the cultural norm that it was the entire body of the snake we were dealing with. From Ministers to Generals, Colonels to Corporals, it was accepted that an integral benefit of your position was to feather your own nest. Senior military officers created ‘ghost’ units; military bodies that existed only on paper, drawing millions in dollars for base infrastructure, food, fuel, uniforms, weapons, vehicles, training and equipment for entities that didn’t exist in the physical world. Ministers squirrelled away funds intended for government initiatives to offshore accounts in the Middle East in preparation for their exodus once the Coalition cut and run. Which they were absolutely convinced we would eventually do. And in which they have been proved right. And the poor soldiers and policemen at the bottom of the pile? Often not receiving their salaries, or sometimes just a tiny portion of them as the hierarchal rank pyramid above them siphoned off their ‘cut’ before the pittance reached the rank and file? Based in Provinces and towns where it takes them days to return to their home villages? No commonality with the populations of these towns other than a very general nationality?
Demoralised and dejected, it’s little wonder they have no motivation to fight. Our model doesn’t work for them. They needed a completely different system that aligned with their cultures, ethos and identities. Plural. There is no one Afghanistan in terms of population identity. Hazaras, Pashtuns, Baluch, Tajik, Uzbek make up just some of the disparate demographics we tried to mould together under a unified national security infrastructure. When we saw that this wasn’t working particularly well, we came up with other, localised initiatives: Afghan Local Police, Khost Protection Force, Counter Terrorist Pursuit Teams. But still, our best laid plans to replicate our Western models always fell short of our aspirations. I once mooted to a senior coalition officer that we were effectively creating the best-trained militias in the world that would soon just be absorbed into their presiding warlord’s arsenal. He didn’t disagree.
The Taliban don’t fight for a pittance of a salary they might or might not receive. They don’t fight on behalf of a national concept they don’t really believe in. They don’t fight for a government that has no real influence beyond the surreal bubble of Kabul. They fight for their beliefs, twisted and abhorrent as they may be. They fight for their absolute conviction that they are returning Afghanistan to the Islamic Republic it was always meant to be. They have a unified goal, driven by their unshakable faith in their ideology and motivated daily by their successes. Which in turn gives them the affirmation that their god supports their struggle, wants them to win.
The Afghan Security Forces have none of this. And the government knows it. In desperation, President Ghani has formally requested assistance from regional warlords to defend and hold their lands against the Taliban advance; a clear acknowledgement that his Army is defeated. But it appears that even this request is too late to achieve anything more than small pockets of resistance as the Taliban sweep through the country conquering villages, towns and cities.
So as the Taliban look set to return Afghanistan to the Stone Age, the people of the country will once again, suffer horrifically. As our Western superpowers pull away from the sinking ship, other nations are considering their response. Russia, always keen to meddle and exploit an opportunity to needle the West, is taking a cautionary approach, bolstering troop numbers in former Soviet satellite states on the border with Afghanistan to monitor and intercept any potential Islamic fundamentalism from seeping through to Russia’s borders. China has already made clear its intention to have a major involvement in what happens in Afghanistan. The Taliban have confirmed they will engage with the Chinese which seems jarringly hypocritical when one considers the treatment of the Uighur Muslims at the hand of the Chinese State. But that’s part and parcel of the realpolitik that China deploys around the globe in its current advancement of influence.
Inevitably, our withdrawal from Afghanistan and the instant gains made by the Taliban draw comparisons with Vietnam. And not completely without merit: A prolonged, unpopular military campaign in a far-off country. A mission creep with ill-defined, shifting objectives. A determined enemy unconcerned by time constraints, budget, political appetites and changes in administrations. A ‘nation’ whose central government has little impact on much of the country beyond the capital. The deaths of of our bright and best young men and women.The deaths of thousands of innocent civilians.
There is an image that, for me at least, summarises the humiliating end game of the Vietnam War. It is the picture of the last helicopter evacuating the US Embassy in Saigon, a chain of figures on the roof of the building urgently boarding. the final flight as the city fell to the Viet Cong. With the latest Pentagon assessment that Kabul could fall within 3 weeks, is this something we can expect to see in Afghanistan? A Black Hawk helicopter evacuating the last few Embassy personnel as Taliban gunfire and mortars wreak havoc on the city?
I hope not. I would hope that with our UAVs, satellites and network of intelligence assets, advanced warning would enable rapid evacuation before the threat was so close. Which is all well and good for our deployed personnel. But for the Afghans in Kabul there is no last chopper. No Black Hawk to spirit them away from advancing hordes of black-turbaned fanatics. No sitting back in the aircraft seat, eyes closed, the smell of AvGas a comforting reminder they are being transported to safety.
For the Afghans, they are going back in time. Back to a time of brutality and repression that they believed had been consigned to history. Human, Gender, and Equal Rights progression not just halted but reversed. The one lifeline open to them would be that of a power-sharing initiative between the Taliban and an Afghan Government. And the country is in a desperate enough position where such an appeasement may be preferable to the government than the wholesale loss of the country to these fanatics. The problem with this though is that the Taliban don’t need to negotiate. They are in the dominant position, winning every battle and fight as they advance through the country. Why would they negotiate for a part of something that they know they will own completely in the near future?
But maybe that won’t happen. Maybe by some miracle and foreign intervention the siege of Kabul can be avoided. Maybe a coalition of warlords can stave off the worst until international assistance can be marshalled into place. Such assistance probably not being led by the West, our withdrawal commitment leaving no political face-saving possibilities for an about turn.
When all is said and done, I wouldn’t want to see a ‘last chopper out of Kabul’ scenario. Wouldn’t like to imagine the panic and fear of the Afghans in Kabul as our last people flew overhead on their way to safety as the enemy was at the gates. The Afghan’s rage as they felt abandoned by a superpower who hadn’t stayed the course they’d committed to. Or the sight of Taliban flags flying above the very institutions that the deaths of thousands of people, trillions of dollars spent, and twenty years of fighting had been invested to protect.
